Thursday, June 19, 2008

Beyond the Greek Cypriot No: an examination of its rationale and a vision for its transcendence (paper for Reconciliation Conference, 20-21/6/2008)


This paper focuses on the 2004 referendum on the Annan Plan attempting to interprete, expain and discuss its overwhelming rejection by the Greek Cypriot electorate. My methodology consists of content analysis of selected press articles and a series of indicative interviews with civil society activists and politicians. Greek Cypriot nationalism does not provide easy answers. That it is entrenched and threatening not only the prospects of re-unification but also the democratisation process by thwarting the critical questioning of national orthodoxies has already been observed and analysed by many researchers and commentators. What I am interested in are the specific ways in and the extent to which nationalist frames were used in the intrepretation of the peace process in general and the referendum in particular and the role of the political leadership in the historical construction and the situational activation of those maps of meaning. The political significance of this attempt has been put succintly by Mavratsas a decade ago: “It is clear that in societies where it constitutes the sole factor that determines political orthodoxy, even the exposition of nationalist ideology constitutes an act of social critique”.

The overwhelmingness of the Greek Cypriot No in 2004 was correctly seen as a step backwards in the reunification process. The huge disappointment it brought to the reconciliation activists has given rise to pessimistic forecasts and gloomy predictions of an eventual partition of Cyprus. However this sort of cold realism fails to fully grasp the structural changes happening in the last decade in Cyprus with repercussions both in the ideological orientation as well as in the political culture of the Greek Cypriot society. Now, four years later when the dust has already settled down, we are in a position to evaluate more soberly both the implications of the Greek Cypriot No as well as the implications of the Turkish Cypriot revolt which allowed the referendum itself in the first place (Demetriou and Vlachos, 2007). With the checkpoints opened for five years now and with significant economic cross border exchanges happening and with pro-solution leaders in both communities and a renewed peace process, we are no longer on the defensive. The issue today is no longer simply to expose nationalist ideology, but to marginalize and overcome it altogether.

Part A: The reasons and the meaning of the G/C No

Although since 1974 Greek nationalism in Cyprus has been defeated in the sense that its political program (enosis) has been abandoned, its basic assumption had not lost its currency in 2004. Enosis was wholly discredited as it came to be associated with the catastrophe that the coup and the war with Turkey brought about. The belief that “Cyprus is Greek” however continued in the words of Mavratsas “to define the parameters of ideological orthodoxy in G/C political culture”. The entrenchment of this basic ideological structure, and the multiplicity of ways through which it was (and to a certain extent is still) expressed constitutes the key to an understanding of the reasons and the meaning of the G/C No.

The difficulty of the G/Cs to accept the T/Cs as politically equal has its roots in what G/Cs conceive as History. This is the grand narrative of Cypriot Hellenism, in which the subject and the moral centre of the story is the Nation, an entity coterminous with History and in this sense eternal. G/C history begins with the settlement of the first Mycenean colonizers during the 14th Century BC “who introduced the Greek language and culture both of which have been preserved to this day1”. This historicist and ahistorical conception of continuity in its effort to construct the transhistorical we, not only excludes the other main ethnic group, but presents it as non-indigenous and therefore gives rise to the belief that its presence on the island is problematic as Papadakis' research has shown. The T/Cs are seen as products of the Turkish conquest of 1573, a mixture of Cypriot Greeks that were forced to convert to Islam and members of the Ottoman army who settled in Cyprus2 (also Int. n.9). Whereas the G/Cs regard themselves as being in Cyprus from the dawn of history, the T/C presence is some sort of an historical accident. One of my informants put this clearly: “We are not Americans. We have history…At the end of the day, what are they? The left-overs of a conquering power!” (Int. n.5). A primordial origin, identifying the G/Cs today with the ‘founders of civilization’, is thus believed to signify cultural superiority. It is the classic case of the Barthean myth: a system of values masquerading as a system of facts. The system of values in question is the classic nationalist belief that ancestry determines status; as a Greek, one is part of a timeless tradition of privilege linked intrinsically to the land. It is within this structure that Papadopoulos’ speech for the referendum calls on the G/C people to vote No, to “defend your righteousness, your dignity and your History3”.

The reluctance of the G/Cs to accept the T/Cs as equal partners was not exhausted in the “superiority” of the G/C historical claim on the island. It also took the form of conceiving them as a minority. “We constitute 80% of the population. The Turks are a minority. They should accept that. It is inconceivable that one T/C vote counts as five G/C votes” (Int. n.9) (also int. 4, 7). The concept of minority however is not a numerical but a socio-political one. A minority depends for the exercise of its rights on the good will of the majority and this is rare in situations where the minority is relatively large (Heraklides, 1991). In the conditions of ethnic conflict that characterized the birth of the Cypriot state, ensuring the protection of the weaker party meant that the principle of majority rule had to be constrained. T/Cs were not attributed the status of a minority but that of a community with equal rights in the running of state affairs enshrined in the veto power of the T/C Vice President. This framework of a consensual state with two equal communities was reaffirmed in 1977 with the official acceptance by the G/C leadership of the bi-communal, bi-zonal federal model. Yet in 2004 many G/Cs continued to view the T/Cs as a minority that should not be able to frustrate the will of the G/C majority.

G/Cs cannot comprehend that their continued insistence on the fundamental Greekness of Cyprus both historically and logically pushed and pushes the T/Cs closer to Turkey. This in its turn makes the G/Cs even more suspicious. In order for the cycle to break both sides have to demonstrate their good will. Some G/Cs however, insist that the first step should be made by the T/Cs. “At the end of the day it is them that have to make the choice: either with us or with Turkey” (Int. 9). This mode of thinking does not allow G/Cs to shift from the stagnant antagonism to the promising cooperation discourse. It induces them to conceptualize the future through the lenses of the past. The agency of Papadopoulos has been again crucial: “decisions will be taken on the basis of equality i.e. 50%, 50% and this gives the opportunity to each side to cause deadlocks that will paralyze the administrative functions of the state4”. The united state provided for by the Annan Plan was thus imagined in the negative terms of its collapse rather than in the positive ones of its success. As illustratively put by the president of a DIKO local committee: “The fear was that we could not have returned to the previous situation of the Republic of Cyprus if the new state did not work out…Could we have maintained the state or would two states have been recognized?”(Int. n.4)

The monopolization of the state by the G/Cs since 1963 has effectively entrenched the idea that the G/Cs are the true Cypriots. The monopoly of legality is not only the biggest political weapon of the G/C politicians, but also the way the political situation is read by their clients. Perceiving the political conflict in legalistic terms however, gives rise to a discourse of reification as old as the conflict itself and intensified after 1974. North Cyprus is referred to as “occupied territory” in contrast to the “free areas” that refer to the southern part. In order to stress the illegal status of the T/C state, G/C media and public speakers feel the need to add the prefix “pseudo” or “so called” prior to any reference to an institution or official that represents it. To an outsider, a sentence like: “the pseudo mayor of Famagusta gave a speech at the so called Eastern Mediterranean University”, might sound bizarre, but for most G/Cs it is not only ethically appropriate and politically necessary, but most importantly normal. G/Cs vote MPs and Councilors that represent districts in the North and consider themselves in temporary exile in their effort to not recognize the “realities” enforced by the “Turkish invasion and illegal occupation”. (Int. n.9) The fact that in 2003 – 2004, 46.9% of the adult population refused to cross the dividing line while 32% have crossed only once or twice5 since April 2003 when the passages opened illustrates the continuing power of the discourse of reification. Crossing the dividing line implies above all coming to terms with the reality: that there is a state and a society in the north and that Turkish is the main language spoken.

Voting Yes in the referendum implied an even bigger step: building upon the reality of the T/C state another common state in which some pseudo-MPs would not only become real MPs but also our MPs. Voting Yes in the referendum essentially involved abandoning the idea of the fundamental Greekness of Cyprus and embracing the idea of a bi-national and simultaneously non-national Cyprus. In order to conceptualize the reunification of Cyprus as a partnership as opposed to a take-over, the discourse of reification needs to be over-come. This is effectively the passage form the formal reality of the legal Cypriot state and the illegal Turkish protectorate to the underlying reality of two ethno-national political communities whose historical conflict can end only through the creation of a non-national political community overlapping the two existing national ones (Kizilyurek 1999) . In order to understand why G/Cs were unable to make this transcendence on the 24th of April 2004, the analyst must look into their basic fear: Turkey.

The demonisation of Turkey has been a fundamental element of the historically constructed G/C political consciousness. For G/Cs Turkish expansionism is the essence of the problem in Cyprus and whether that is seen as an inherent feature of Turkish nature as the Right claimed or a consequence of its position in the imperialist chain as the Left claimed (Papadakis, 1998, p.78), Turkey’s desire to control Cyprus is more or less taken for granted. The shift of Turkish policy with respect to Cyprus pioneered by Ertogan’s government took both the G/C leadership and the electorate by surprise and their inability to account for this change led them to the conclusion that it was temporary and tactical and ought to be viewed with suspicion. Moreover, the No campaign was able to tap on historical G/C anti-Turkish prejudice to argue that Turkey cannot be trusted to abide by the agreement.

Anti-Turkish prejudice is relatively rooted in G/C political consciousness. The inter-communal conflict since 1955 and most importantly the war with Turkey in 1974, as well as some sporadic incidents of violence after that, most notably those of 19966, allowed for the popularization of the image of the barbarian and thus dehumanized Turk. This image is inculcated in G/C education and needless to say the conscription based G/C National Guard for the male population. Chauvinistic chants in the army are not rare (personal experience) and constitute the culmination of an education system that promotes the idea of eternal animosity between the Greek and the Turkish nations. School children learn that the “real aim (of the Turkish invasion) was to conquer and Turkify Cyprus. This invasion of the Turks brought the third blow against Hellenism after the fall of Constantinople in 1453 and the Asia Minor disaster in 1922.7” This “historical pattern” of Turkish aggression is instrumental in building the dialectic of self-righteousness and demonization of the enemy. Framing the conflict in Cyprus as one between Turkish expansionism and the need for Cypriot (i.e. G/C) resistance is fundamental not only in legitimizing the G/C regime of power built upon the fear of Turkey, but also absolving the G/C political class from any responsibility past or present for the current situation. Accepting the compromise of the Annan Plan would have required a radical break with the tradition of hatred/enemy promotion in the educational system. When one has in mind that even the militarization of the conflict was considered a viable policy option as late as 1999, one understands the difficulty of transcending this suffocating structure.

The demonization of Turkey is the fundamental axis of ethno-national unity among G/Cs as it is considered legitimate both by those G/C leaning on the Cypriot pole, like AKEL’s supporters and those that lean on the Greek pole of G/C political consciousness. While these two tendencies may differ in their perceptions and degrees of acceptance of the T/Cs (the issue of minority or community mentioned earlier) they are united in their firm rejection of Turkish claims to be protecting the T/Cs. The official position that Turkey is the aggressor that has victimized both communities in Cyprus is relatively entrenched. This leads to the acceptance of the paternalistic position of the G/C political class with respect to the T/Cs who do not understand their real interests, which lie with the G/Cs rather than with Turkey. There is in other words an antagonism posited between the G/Cs and Turkey and in which the T/Cs are basically irrelevant since they are under Turkish occupation and their leader, Denktas was Ankara’s puppet. This simplistic model was shaken when Ertogan’s government did not support the governing coalition in the December 2003 elections in North Cyprus and actually attacked Denktas for being intransigent and extremist. Not being able to understand that there was a real shift of Turkish policy in the sense that the maintenance or legalization of the status quo of partition in Cyprus was no longer a Turkish priority, at least for the pro-European forces represented by Ertogan, G/Cs followed their leadership in conceiving the Ertogan-Denktas conflict as a pseudo-conflict. “The basic difference between today’s Ankara and Denktas and also all previous Turkish governments is in the much improved publicity politics of the former.8 The G/C leadership was taken by surprise in New York (Int. n.6) when the Turkish side actually demonstrated its readiness for compromise9. Not being ready themselves for the compromise, the G/C political leaders were not in a position to prepare the G/C electorate for the compromise (Int. n.3). Having no other language available to justify their rejection, they continued on the same discourse of Turkish maximalism in order to demonstrate that the solution that Turkey might accept will be one that the G/Cs cannot accept.

The main proof that the Annan Plan was a Turkish solution10 that ought to be rejected was the provisions concerning the Turkish population of North Cyprus, the famous “settlers”, the majority of which were to remain and acquire Cypriot citizenship. Encouraged by the tensions between the T/Cs and the settlers and the slow and incomplete integration of the latter into T/C society, G/Cs have elaborated an intransigence in their condemnation of these people, seen as a war crime and as evidence of Turkey’s strategy to Turkify Cyprus. “Their high birth rates might allow them in a few years to become more than us. Cyprus will be Turkified. This is the final aim of Ankara.11” The settlers are not “our Turks”, but “Turkey’s Turks” and as such not only cannot be trusted, but their very existence is unacceptable; they are seen as responsible both for the past deeds of the Turkish government and military as well as the instrument for their future ones. In order to ensure that the settlers were seen as the extension of the Turkish state, Simerini newspaper claimed that “most of those that will remain are ex-officers of the Turkish army who are now in reserve.12” The link between these people and the Turkish state needed not be established in the dramatic terms of a military threat but also in the terms of a political disturbance: “what is easier for Turkey than to order the settler-senators or presidential councilors13 to freeze every activity of the state”14. The political parties and most importantly the President himself encouraged this mode of thinking. The latter’s reference to the “satisfaction of Turkey’s objective to control Cyprus15” was followed by his reference to the settlers remaining. Giddens’ insight on the duality of structure is useful here: agents utilize the structures (Turkish migrants as extensions of the Turkish state, Turkey as threat) and thereby reproduce them.

If G/Cs viewed the settlers as an indirect way of Turkish control over Cyprus, the presence of Turkish troops and the guarantor status of Turkey were seen as a more direct threat. According to the Annan Plan, the G/Cs and the T/Cs were to demilitarize and an equal number of Greek and Turkish troops was to remain, 6000 until 2012 and 3000 each until 2018, droping thereafter to 950 Greeks and 650 Turks. However since G/Cs have historically learnt to view the conflict as one between them and Turkey, the demilitarization of the T/Cs and the increase of Greek troops in Cyprus was downplayed and the projected image was: “our army was to be dissolved immediately while their army was to leave gradually and not completely” (Int. n.2) The small Turkish contingency force that was to be stationed permanently in Cyprus was to “have extensive interventionist rights in the G/C constituent state, while we would have dissolved the National Guard”16 said the President while not mentioning that the same was true for the Greek contingency force. When one has in mind that the official G/C version of history is that in 1974 Turkey found the excuse it always wanted to occupy Cyprus, maintaining the right of intervention logically meant that Turkey could find another excuse and intervene again if it continued to be an expansionist power. However if Turkey is an expansionist power, why withdraw its troops from Cyprus in the first place?

This was indeed the basic fear and logic upon which the rejectionist camp invested: Turkey will not abide by the agreement and the G/C state will not receive the territory that is ceded to it according to the Annan Plan17. This argument was the most powerful one because it could not be countered. The whole debate shifted from the actual provisions of the Annan Plan on speculations about the motives and objectives of Turkish foreign policy. The rejectionist camp could then argue more forcefully that since it was Turkey’s ambition to enter in the EU that caused the shift in its policy, a potential rejection or delay of its accession by the EU was to remove Turkey’s incentive to withdraw its army. The President emphasized the need to view Turkey’s sincerity with suspicion with phrases such as “we buy hope”, “empty expectations” and “unsubstantiated illusions that Turkey will abide by the agreement”18. The No campaign produced long lists of Turkish violations of agreements, crimes and aggressive policies during the 20th Century, in order to prove that “the incredibility of Turkey does not allow us to trust it TODAY19”. The fear of the non-implementation of the agreement was ultimately fundamental in swaying even many people that had a direct economic interest in the solution, such as for example the property owners in the territory that was to be ceded to the G/C state and need not have gone through the complex compensation procedures, that the property owners in the territory of the T/C state would have had. This shows that ideological structures can create fears that overpower economic interests.

The fear of the non-implementation of the agreement was ultimately the most important factor that determined the referendum result. This is because of its instrumentality in shifting AKEL’s position from the Yes vote decided by the Political Bureau to the Postponement or No decision of the Central Committee and its confirmation by the Party Congress. AKEL was like most parties internally divided and although the leadership’s judgment of the Plan was that “its positive elements if accepted despite the dangers could create a hopeful potentiality for the peaceful coexistence of G/Cs and T/Cs” in opposition to the President’s judgment that “it legalizes and deepens partition” that same leadership felt obliged to take into consideration “objective factors”20. These objective factors refered to the rejectionist climate created after the President’s speech, the political cost for the party if it came out on the losing side of the referendum, and most importantly the loss of both power and credibility in the case of breaking the alliance with the President that it so recently had put to power. However it is important to note that AKEL’s bizarre stance, expressed in its leader’s phrase that became an anecdote (we vote No in order to solidify the Yes), what Mouzelis aptly described as “an attempt to square the circle21” makes sense and most importantly was made possible only because of the widespread fear of the non-implementation of the agreement. AKEL’s effort to allay this fear however, in the form of asking for Security Council guarantees for the implementation of the agreement had the opposite effect: acknowledging the danger of non-implementation and reinforcing the feeling of insecurity among G/Cs.

“The Turk” (Int. n.2) is effectively the G/Cs’ homogenized Other22. In so far as T/Cs are perceived to be Turks or leaning towards Turkey the suspicion against them seems insurmountable. Although the fear of the Turkish state has a rational geo-political component it cannot be fully understood in rationalist terms. This is because all the factors that could lead one to vote No, could be turned on their head and induce one to vote Yes. In the absence of a solution: the number of settlers was bound to increase rather than decrease and 40 000 Turkish troops were bound to remain. However in a solution scenario, the Turk could no longer be abstracted from daily life, romanticized as our T/C brothers (AKEL) or demonized as the “rapists of our wives, and killers of our fathers and brothers23”. A solution would have brought to light the contradiction between the reality of the Turkish speaking human beings and their mythical barbarian image. Most G/Cs were not ready to deal with this psychological shock.

The fear of Turkey was relatively entrenched and thus the rejectionist campaign had an easy job in bringing it out. The fear of economic collapse however, required a much bigger and sustained effort, to prevail and the rejectionist forces were not wholly successful in instilling it. They were successful though, in tapping upon the conservatism of a society enjoying relatively high living standards and exploiting its aversion to any sort of potentially destabilizing change. The much lower living standards in the North effectively allowed ethnic and class prejudice to merge, one reinforcing the other.

Being in charge of the stronger economy the G/C constituent state was ultimately going to contribute more resources for the infrastructural projects of the federal state, the compensations and for sustaining the federal bureaucracy. That the solution would have had a short term cost for the G/Cs until the merging of the two economies was beyond doubt. The rejectionist camp exaggerated the magnitude of that cost24. The government in its effort to predispose the public against the Annan Plan both during and especially after the negotiations emphasized the uncertainty and the risks that the solution entailed and did not mince its words. “Its economic viability is doubtful. Its implementation will have severe repercussions for G/Cs while the whole structure of the Plan will lead if not to the collapse of the Cypriot economy, definitely in severe economic crisis with consequences on the living standards of the G/Cs that have been achieved with so many sacrifices.25” The chief of the Central Bank during the negotiations had warned that the economy would collapse and called everybody who respected him to vote No after the final version of the Plan came out.

However there were political analysts and economists that told a different story: that the economy of the south was dynamic and strong enough to absorb any negative effects consequent upon its unification with the stagnant and weak one of the north and that the abolition of the defense budget was to cover for most infrastructural projects and general expenses26. Like law, economics is not a politically neutral science, if there can be one and there is no objective economic analysis but objectives in the economic analyses. It is here that the issue of ethno-centric prejudice needs to be addressed. This is because it is to say the least, naïve, to talk about an economic collapse as a mere consequence of building a federal state structure. When one has in mind the less official connotations of the economic collapse theory, such as the notion of the “laziness of the Turks” who will be parasitic on the hard working and entrepreneurial G/Cs, and the racist anecdotes that were circulating at the time, one gets a clearer picture of the discourse of the economic cost. An interview of DIKO Vice President Cleanthous during the negotiations is illustrative of the intension of a certain section of the leadership as to how the political economic situation ought to be understood: “the other side wants the G/Cs to be something like serfs to work and contribute a substantial part of our income while they will have the right to intervene like shepherds directly or indirectly in all activities that until today we were free to engage in.27” This bad will and suspicion maintaining mentality constituted the necessary ideological fortification of the status quo and its reproduction was vital for the No campaign.

The success of the No campaign in instilling fear can only be understood in relative terms and with specific groups of people. The civil servants for example were told that the Annan Plan did not clarify their status, working hours and conditions, benefits and pensions and were then asked to answer in two days whether they are prepared to accept their transfer to the federal state in case of Yes vote28. The military personnel was told by the Minister of Defense that the state was in financial difficulty and consequently the fulfillment of its obligation to compensate them for the loss of their jobs could be delayed. People with properties in the T/C constituent state (i.e. excluding those in the territory that was to come under the jurisdiction of the G/C state) were told that the bonds and shares through which they were to be compensated were of doubtful validity. “It is doubtful whether the Federal State that will guarantee one third of the compensations will be a liable guarantor so as to avert the decline of bond value as was the case with the stock-market29”. The reference of the President to what happened in the stock-market30 was instrumental, inviting the G/Cs to view with suspicion the Property Compensations Board and its procedures. Furthermore the provision that the Property Compensations Board was to take into consideration the aid that the claimants had already received, (e.g. state housing) added to the feeling of uncertainty.

Ultimately G/Cs saw little benefit and too much risk in a unification scheme especially at the specific moment in time with the entry into the EU. The north and its citizens seemed more as a burden, at least in the short term, a remnant of Cyprus’ former Third World identity, in contrast to the European south. Having said that however does not mean that the majority of the G/Cs were or indeed are, not interested in unification. To be sure many G/Cs were not, as demonstrated in a survey just after the referendum in which 28% opted for the status quo or a two states solution31. However there are many others whose decision to vote No had more to do with the timing and the geo-politics of the peace process and most importantly with the climate that prevailed, rather than with their opposition to unification per se. Given the complexity of the Annan Plan and the multidimensionality of the political parameters involved, the agency of the politician expert was fundamental in shifting the balance towards the No. More so, because President Papadopoulos and his associates were successful in framing the No as a No to this solution which was to leave the door open for “a more hopeful path to the reunification of our country through the EU32”.

The decision of the EU in April 2003, that the unification of Cyprus was not a condition for its accession essentially removed all the pressure from the G/C political class to seek an agreement prior to 1st May 2004. Under the assumption and hope that its bargaining power was to increase since the G/Cs and Greece would be inside the EU and the T/Cs and Turkey outside trying to enter, the G/C government wanted to avoid negotiations, while at the same time could not afford to be seen as intransigent. After the unsuccessful attempt to bring the New York summit into a close, by sharing responsibility with Denktas33, Papadopoulos agreed to the tight negotiations process and Annan’s arbitration culminating in simultaneous referenda prior to 1st May 2004, because he felt confident that as the newly elected leader of the G/C community he was in a position to impose the terms of national unity and mobilize public opinion, against the Annan Plan34.

The Secretary General alongside many foreign diplomats insisted that a potential failure of the peace process was to likely to freeze the status quo since the Annan Plan was the last peace plan to be drafted by the UN. This was countered by the government’s slogan that “1st May is not the end of history for the Cyprus Problem.35” Whether it was or was not the last chance for a solution, was the biggest theme in the pre referendum debates and the No supporters had the clear advantage. The fact that the UN officials had said that the third version was the last peace plan they were to draft as well, allowed the rejectionists to claim that a sixth version was not unlikely. This was linked to rumors about a likely repetition of the referendum if rejected allowing the No campaign to smartly insist that the No is reversible while the Yes is not. In the climate of puzzlement and uncertainty about a decision so huge in its implications, it was the Yes campaign that had to be the offensive one because as the catchy slogan adopted by the leader of the No campaign goes: “when in doubt, leave it out” (Int n.9). After all, “why all this hurry just before we entered Europe?”(Int n.7). The last chance discourse, problematic as it was, received the final blow by the President in his speech: “The view that this will be the last initiative for the solution is dogmatism and demonstrates ignorance of the rules of international politics. The basic parameters that brought this initiative will continue to exist after 25th April.36”

The No campaign, building upon so many years of G/C emphasis on the international dimension of the conflict was able to frame the referendum as the decision whether “our struggle for independence from Britain first and then Turkey” (Int. n.4) is over or not. From this perspective a Yes vote symbolized giving up the Republic of Cyprus’s struggle for sovereignty while a No vote symbolized continuing it. In an age of globalization and in an institution such as the EU where state sovereignty is a matter of daily negotiation and compromise, its prevailing conceptualization in the G/C community remained conventional, that is as a fixed and absolute political phenomenon. Thus the flux and shared sovereignty regime provided for in the Annan Plan, in conjunction with the maintenance of the guarantor status of Greece, Turkey and Britain and their stationing of troops, was presented as sufficient proof that the struggle for our independence was not going to finish. The only thing that was going to change were the conditions of the struggle. “We are called upon to dissolve our internationally recognized statehood, precisely at the moment when its international political weight increases with our entry into the EU.37” In other words, if the T/Cs want unification they should return to the now European Republic of Cyprus and break completely from Turkey.

The entrenched anti-Americanism of the G/Cs38 was utilized in the effort of the G/C political class to counter the insistence of US officials on the necessity of an agreement. The logic went: if it is in the interests of UK-US that we accept this solution at this moment, how can it also be in our interests? “If after May 1st our case will be worse than today and we therefore have to accept the Annan Plan now, why do the Anglo-Americans insist in a solution prior to May 1st?39”The impression was created that the Anglo-Americans were trying to set up a trap for the G/Cs in order to help their Turkish allies. “The Anglo-Americans wanted to help Turkey enter the EU, not achieve a solution: that is why they were promoting the Plan” (Int. n.4). The “heroic No” (Int. n.1) thus came to symbolize the resistance to “imperialism”, an empowering act of national and human dignity for both left and right.

The view that the Anglo-Americans were effectively trying to neutralize the G/C advantage with the accession of the Republic of Cyprus into the EU through their insistence on the Annan Plan was not only widespread but also the basis for more grandiose claims. These took the form of positing a conflict between the US and the EU, one between interests and principles. In this scenario, “the US wants to satisfy Turkey, put it into the EU and use it as a Troyan Horse against the EU through and over Cyprus.40”Thus the G/Cs by rejecting the Anglo-American Annan Plan they were “defending the principles and values of the EU which aim at the peace and prosperity of peoples41”. The fact that the EU endorsed the Annan Plan was explained away through the natural preference of the EU bureaucrats not to inherit the problem and its complex implications. However the view that it was incompatible with the acqui communitaire was so entrenched that Verheugen, the official responsible for EU enlargement attempted to reassure G/Cs that it was not and asked two G/C television channels to allow him address the G/C public. The fact that he was turned down by both42 under the excuse that he was bound to exert pressure on the will of the sovereign People, is illustrative not only of the rejectionist climate that prevailed but also of the significance of the idealization of Europe in the No campaign, which could not afford to allow the EU openly appear as a Yes force.

The European solution was the central slogan of the No campaign. What this entailed however, remained unclear beyond the platitudes about the “recognition, guarantees and implementation of all sorts of human and political rights and individual liberties for all the citizens of the Republic43”.
When one has in mind that this Republic is the now G/C dominated state which “should be maintained as unitary, indivisible and sovereign44”, then the “European solution” stands for a politically motivated depoliticisation of ethnicity (the principle of majority rule), the take-over of North Cyprus through legal means. This is a necessary consequence of the reification of the T/C society and government mentioned earlier, based upon the refusal to recognize “the realities imposed on this country by the Turkish invasion and occupation.45” Since the T/C society and its institutions do not exist (the pseudo discourse) the “anti-European” Annan Plan “not only does not unite but creates structures and institutions of division46”. However, demanding the impossible (a unitary state) while acknowledging that “as time passes things become worse” (Int. n.9), can only but leave one to conclude that the status quo is not really a problem. As the leader of the Pancyprian Citizens' Movement put it: “Why should we be so selfish and demand the closing of the issue in our life-time?” (Int. n.9).

The evidence for the anti-European character of the Annan Plan was further and most importantly to be found in the suspension of the full implementation of human rights through the various restrictions it imposed on the property market and rights of residence of members of one ethnic group in the state of the other. “In the Plan of the Secretary General there are restrictions in the human rights on the basis of ethnic origin, real for G/Cs and only theoretical for T/Cs47”. Although these restrictions had a temporary character, the permanent residential ones rendered insignificant in nineteen years48 while the property market ones up to the time when the T/C per capita income reached 85% of G/C per capita income, this did not prevent the No campaigners from accusing the Annan Plan of eternalizing human rights violations. Given the complexity and multi-dimensionality of the Cyprus Problem, as Kofi Annan explained, it is simply impossible to implement all human rights immediately after an agreement, since there are cases where the human rights of certain groups are in conflict with those of other groups. Since human rights do not have a nationality, it makes little sense to talk about the human rights of the G/Cs prioritizing them over those of the T/Cs and mainland Turks. Some G/Cs understood that. “I felt injustice because in my house there are settlers... On the other hand, settlers have been in my house since 1976. Children were born there. It is their house. These are hard questions… I feel it is my place, yet I know it is also their place.” (Int. n.6) The proponents of the European solution however saw things differently. ”You cannot restrict property rights. It was a mistake that G/Cs touched T/C properties in the south. Now all the T/Cs and settlers should move out from our properties and take back theirs. Those that do not have should be given a loan by the government to buy one and there is plenty of state land, where state housing can be built and given to them.” (Int. n.9) The belief that this is not only fair but also possible “now that we are Europeans” (Int. n.2) derives from the perception that “the property right is considered sacred in Europe and generally in every democratic society.49”

The symbol of the “anti-European” character of the Annan Plan was the provision asking the leaders of the two communities to send a letter to the European Court of Human Rights asking for the withdrawal of all the appeals for property issues and a letter to EU so as to prevent appeals to the European Court of Human Rights, since these were to be arranged internally. The success of the Loizidou case in the Strassburg court forcing Turkey to compensate her for the prevention of use of her property effectively served as the banner of the displaced G/Cs who were assured “that Turkey will be forced to give billions of pounds if there is no solution in which the rightful owners abandon their property rights50”. Although Loizidou’s lawyers themselves did explain that the property issue could not be solved on a case by case basis and that a collective arrangement was needed, the proponents of the European solution were very influential even with respect to those that were going to receive all their property back. “Who will compensate me for all those years? Under that Plan, I would not have been allowed to demand compensation as I was advised that I have the right to” (Int. 2).

The entry of the Republic of Cyprus into the European Union led G/Cs to the belief that their geopolitical weight was to increase to such an extent that a more beneficial settlement could be achieved. Europe in G/C political consciousness is a multidimensional concept. As the incarnation of law and justice, it was expected to stand as a defense to the pro-Turkish US-UK machinations. As the High Priest of property rights, it was expected to prevent any diversions, even temporary ones, from free market principles in a potential settlement. Thus, rejecting the Anglo-American Annan Plan was not seen as the rejection of reunification but the continuation of the struggle in improved conditions to achieve a European and thus, better solution.

Part B: The implications of the G/C No

Although it was perhaps a bit early in 2004 to evaluate the historical import and consequences of the G/C No and too difficult to predict future developments, given the confusion that prevailed both in the international and in the domestic political scene during the rest of Papadopoulos' term, today some tendencies can be discerned. The impacts like the causes of the G/C No are multiple and although phenomenally little has changed in the sense that the political and ideological status quo remains firm, the failure of the peace process and the referendum has unleashed previously latent forces and has raised the stakes in the contest between its entrenchment and its transcendence.

The overwhelming G/C No has ultimately and logically sent the message to the international community that the G/Cs are not interested in unification. In his report to the Security Council Kofi Annan was explicit: “While they state their firm support for unification, many view too little gains and too much disturbance and risk in an arrangement…If G/Cs are ready to share power and prosperity with the T/Cs in a federal structure based on political equality, they must demonstrate this not only with words but also with actions.51” What this meant was effectively the refusal of the UN to take the initiative for re-starting the peace process without the prior demonstration of G/C good will. Since the Annan Plan is there, approved by the T/Cs and endorsed by the EU, it is the G/Cs that have to state what changes if any will make it acceptable and thus create the conditions for restarting the negotiations. As far as the EU was concerned the priority immediately after the referenda was the delivery of 259 million euros that had been set aside under a reunification scenario, to the T/Cs in order to strengthen the economy of the North and limit T/C emigration. The Commission eventually proceeded to give part of the money directly, that is by-passing the G/C government rejecting the latter’s demand to act as the mediator due to its status as the government of the only recognized state in Cyprus. The second and more critical issue for which the G/C government has threatened the Commission with legal action is the expressed desire of the latter to consider north Cyprus as a third country with respect to trade of goods and services regulations and thus authorize the use of airports and ports in the north. Given the serious political implications of such a move, effectively recognizing the T/C state in all but name, the EU eventually postponed the taking of a decision on that matter. This is because aside the legal obstacles that the EU itself has erected in the past (e.g. the 1994 European Court of Justice ruling banning exports from the north; Tocci, 2004, p.5) the political will of the EU actors to bring north Cyprus closer to the EU without a parallel improvement of north-south relations seems for the moment lacking. Moreover the uncertainty that prevails concerning Turkey’s European path is conducive to the reluctance of the EU actors to implement policies with respect to north Cyprus. The EU however cannot and will not delay decisions for ever. If the current peace process fails again because of G/C intransigence then the Commission might summon the necessary political will and overcome the legal obstacles since sanctioning of the use of airports and ports is a necessity for the economic development of the north; the objections of the south cannot delay it for ever.

The internal implications of the G/C No are more complex and difficult to discern. Schematically they can be summed up as the crystallization of two latent tendencies whose political expression and agenda is at variance with the official rhetoric and nominal objective. The Annan Plan has effectively given shape to what that abstract thing called “solution” meant or could mean. As such it has brought to the fore two diametrically opposed tendencies expressed in two slogans: a. the “leave them over there and us over here” and b. the “solution-unification-now”. Whereas the former approach used to be considered as traitorous for accepting the final loss of north Cyprus and thus its proponents were reluctant to express it in public, it has now become widespread and socially acceptable, although not yet officially sanctioned. The two-states solution, once a dream of the T/C nationalists is now the preferred settlement by a significant G/C minority52. The solution-unification-now proponents are fewer but more outspoken and politically articulate, and refuse to be cowed by the continuous references of their political opponents to the result of the referendum. Most importantly they organize popular events and gatherings in the north in conjunction with T/C organizations and thus challenge directly the reification discourse53. The contest between these two tendencies is fundamental in the shaping of the political dynamics in the G/C community and by implication for the prospects of the resolution of the conflict.

In between these two tendencies lies the silent majority that has rejected the Annan Plan in preference for the status quo only because it considers the latter temporary, something to be tolerated while waiting for a better deal. Its loyalty to Papadopoulos remained firm but should not have been taken for granted because it was based on the belief that a better deal was possible and that his hard line was to bring it about. As time passed and an agreement continued to be elusive, the patience of this silent majority decreased and became more vulnerable both to the partitionist and the solution-now influence. In other words, since the hard line pursued by Papadopoulos made compromise an unlikely eventuality, the status quo was entrenched on the one hand and weakened on the other. This is because the more the status quo began to seem permanent, the less tolerable it became. It was undermined both by the forces that wanted to transcend it, and by those that are prepared to accept its legalization, but do not yet speak it out.

Ultimately the key factor in the balance between the forces of the status quo and the forces of its transcendence was and still is AKEL. As the only party that has been historically and ideologically committed to rapprochement and has been steadily declaring the need for the historical compromise, its stance in the referendum provoked a serious internal crisis. In the elections for the European Parliament it faced its biggest electoral defeat dropping from 35% to 28% and it has lost touch with a significant section of its rank and file who felt betrayed with the leadership’s continued qualified support to the hard line pursued by Papadopoulos. On the other hand, breaking the alliance with Papadopoulos before the end of his term however was bound to lead to the loss of power and all the benefits that accompany it in a Mediterranean country where politics is significantly based on patron-client relationships. Thus AKEL remained more or less trapped in a lose-lose situation deciding to continue its stay in government, while separating itself from the more maximalist positions adopted by the President.

DISI, the main party that supported the Annan Plan faced an even bigger crisis with a group actually splitting off and forming a new party with a hard line on the Cyprus problem. Nevertheless in the European elections DISI’s losses were limited and its new post-referendum emphasis on rapprochement (the traditional policy of AKEL) not only prepares the G/Cs for a solution, but also keeps the pressure high on AKEL to return to its old course or lose votes. The fact that AKEL did return to its old course with the candidacy of Christofias as the President of “the solution” is not irrelevant to the firm pro-solution stance of DISI.

Ultimately the G/C No, or rather its overwhelmingness has reduced the prospects for a resolution of the conflict at least in the immediate and foreseeable future. It has made the repetition of the referendum (on the same Plan) impossible and has reduced international interest for a new initiative. As long as Papadopoulos remained in power, with the support of AKEL, the situation was unlikely to change because he could afford to continue to ignore the calls for “solution-unification now”, and offer tacit political cover for the partitionist tendency. When AKEL however moved into opposition and raised the pressure on Papadopoulos for a solution, the balance between the forces of the status quo and those of its transcendence begun to shift towards the latter.

Part C: The changing context, the new initiative and its potential

What does the status quo mean however in Cyprus and what form does its transcendance take? For one thing, the status quo in 2004 is not the same as the status quo of 2008. And most importantly it is not bound to be the same in the future. This is the fundamental reason for the coming defeat of the rejectionist camp. Because they fail to undestand that the world is changing, they are destined to be marginalised by its change. On a practical basis, their philosophy has been defeated in the last presidential elections and although they are currently recouping their forces, they are ultimately fighting a losing battle. At some point soon the status quo will no longer be a second best solution but simply an impossible one, just as an impossible one is the majoritarian Greek Cypriot state desired by the Greek Cypriot establishment54. This is delayed only because the EU does not favour partition yet. But this will not go on for ever. In the absence of a settlement, the terms of the current partition will at some point need to be negotiated and for that matter continually reaffirmed. The present anomaly can no longer avoid the historical forces of change.

Developments since 2004 have changed the parameters of the problem in important respects. First is the economic development in the north building primarily on the construction and tourist industries benefiting directly from the exploitation of G/C land. This brings about complications in the property issue pushing the settlement towards the direction of compensations as opposed to restitution. The TRNC committee of Compensations has already been recognised as an efficent domestic legal procedure in an attempt to counter the numerous G/C appeals to the European Court of Human Rights. The legalistic approach of Papadopoulos and the G/C government's encouragement for individual appeals to the European Court of Human Rights has provoked the opposite results. It is more generally the case that political problems require political solutions and that they cannot be approached legalistically. This Papadopoulos continued to refuse to understand throught his term55.

Even his greatest success, in the form of the new agreement reached between the two Cypriot leaders on 8th July 2006, had as its primary issue the procedures established and not the essence which was the achievement of a settlement. This is not to deny the significance of that agreement which as Lordos (2006) says, does constitute a novel, more EU inspired approach to negotiations based on the lessons learnt from the failure of the Annan Plan, giving an expanded role to the committees and the working groups as opposed to the leaders. However the inability of Papadopoulos and Talat to enforce that agreement is indicative of the more deep-rooted causes of the post referenda deadlock in the peace process.

The most important change since the referendum however is the victory of Christofias in this year's presidential elections. As mentioned before, AKEL was in 2004 and still remains in 2008 the key political force potentially capable to transcend the status quo. This is because of its rapprochement history and its Cypro-centric ideology, whose analysis is beyond the scope of this paper. What is the issue here is the process through which AKEL managed to rise to executive power. It begun publicising its disagreements with Papadopoulos and accepting DISI's argument that Papadopoulos had destroyed the Republic's credibility in the EU and the UN as well as the Turkish Cypriot community. AKEL wanted a “president of solution” and put forward its own leader as the candidate. This led to the breakup of the three party coalition as DIKO and EDEK refused to discuss even the possibility of not supporting Papadopoulos for a second term. AKEL had effectively no choice but to leave government and challenge Papadopoulos through the ballot. Many analysts have seen this move as one imposed on the leadership by the party rank and file members who gave a two-third majority to independent candidacy when asked to do so. However it might have also been the result of a long-term leadership strategy deviced just after Papadopoulos' speech prior to the referedum. Seen in this light, Christofias' statement that “we vote No in order to solidify the Yes” is ultimately making sense56. In other words we stay in government until the end and then take the leadership of the coalition and direct it towards an overwhelming victory in a future modified version of the settlement. This hypothesis can only be empirically tested when the minutes of AKEL's Political Bureau and Central Commitee meetings become available. What became directly apparent however with Christofias' candidacy was that most of the Yes forces of 2004 of both Left and Right rejoiced. A termination of the Cyprus deadlock was finally within sight. EDI and the extraparliamentary Left offered their support as they saw Christofias standing firmly on a reunification platform, posing in front of Pentadaktylos and claiming that “now is the time to reunify our country” and thus raising the high hopes for a negotiated settlement. This significant shift in AKEL policy destroyed the emerging ethnarchic pretenses of Papadopoulos on the basis of a rejectionist, “fighting for national rights” discource and returned the Greek Cypriot political establishment on the bearings of the painful compromise again.

The change in the political culture and ideological orientation of the G/C community is probably greater than it seems. The Cyprocentric flavour of the rejectionist campaign fighting to preserve “our Republic” both during and immediately after the referendum lies in stark contrast to the hellenochristian ideals promoted during Clerides' decade. The mere expression of support to DISI's youth chanting “Cyprus is Greek” had to be uttered in an apologetic manner by Kasoulides, something which shows that what was the natural or normal order of yesterday does not apply today. More generally Kasoulides' attempt to play the card of Greek nationalism between the first and the second round of the presidential elections failed dismally to appeal to the Greek Cypriot electorate and allowed Christofias to gain an easy victory in the elections. When one has in mind that the presidential elections a decade ago were contested on the grounds of who was more determined and capable to bring the S-300 missiles to Cyprus, one can sense a steady evolutionary retreat of nationalism in the G/C society.

A key moment in the retreat of the nationalist discource of separation was undoubtedly the increased interaction between the two communities facilitated by the opening of the checkpoints57. This not only delegitimised historical prejudice but also made the concept of the solution a comprehensible one. Although as Demetriou points out, the state re-emerged after the initial shock, for many G/Cs a glimpse of reunification as a lived experience has already passed to their collective memory. This is undoubtedly a significant factor in the reunification process. A significant minority has also managed to establish social and / or occupational links and contacts with the other side and practises repeated visits to the north. Today in the absense of the “better solution” promised by Papadopoulos, thousands of Turkish Cypriots work and shop in the south, Greek Cypriots visit the north and the “Cold War” tension between the two regimes has subsided. A reunification “event” of a relatively smaller magnitude has happened with the opening of Ledra street, with again significant repercussions in the Greek Cypriot conceptual universe. It might be far fetched to claim that the solution is closer today compared to early 2004 but it is closer compared to the days immediately after the referenda. With hindsight we can say that perhaps in the period 2003-2004 too many things happened too soon, not allowing the G/Cs to come to terms with the changes. Today the conception of the reunification process is much more politically mature compared to the 2003-2004 era.

The failure of Cyprus' entry into the EU to change the balance of power in favour of the G/Cs discredited the concept of the “European solution” while the process of income and prices convergence between the north and the south58, has decreased the potential immediate cost of the solution as well as the transitional period needed for the merging of the two economies into one, that is the catching up time of the north with the south. Thus the two primary politically contingent reasons for the G/C No as identified earlier have been significantly weakened and are most probably to be absent in a future attempt for a renegotiated settlement. The more social-historical factors that is the concept of the Greekness of Cyprus and the fear of Turkey remain in place although they are significantly weaker in 2008 than they were in 2004. Educational reform away from ethnocentrism has already begun since 2004 with the committee of the seven academics, and although not completed, the mere fact of its presence as a guiding document in the Ministry of Education, shows that at least a section of the G/C elite is prepared to revise the philosophy and ideological orientation of the educational system. The fear of Turkey remains in place but that again is not the same as it was in 2004. Ertogan's conflict with the deep state in Turkey can no longer be presented as a pseudo-conflict given the serious form it has taken lately. Just prior to the referendum, the dominant conception was that of a monolithic Turkey and Ertogan as essentially no different from the generals. Today this conception is no longer sustainable. This is not to say that G/Cs are no longer afraid of Turkey, but the destruction of its monolithic and inherently expansionist military image does constitute a step forward.


The G/C No was neither inevitable nor accidental. It was the product of social historical and politically contingent factors and these two dimensions cannot be separated. Nationalist ideological structures, the frames through which the stakes in the referendum were evaluated were not invented by the No campaign. They should more usefully be seen as the social historical product of the separation and the reification discource. However we should keep in mind that the concept of power is not exclusively a structural one since individuals, leaders and led alike are not mere bearers of the structures but also agents whose contingent actions reproduce and transform them. The agency of Papadopoulos and the multi-party coalition supporting him was undoubtedly fundamental in the rejection of the Annan Plan, since it was primarily through them that the electorate learnt about the provisions of the Plan and the geo-political implications of both the Yes and the No. However the relationship between the leaders and the led is not one-dimensional but dialectical. Although it was the leaders who decided to reject the plan, their decision was informed and influenced by a hesitant and puzzled electorate, who ultimately shares along with its leaders the responsibility for the maintenance of the status quo.

AKEL's hesitation to follow up on the analysis and decision of its highest body, the Political Bureau and to postpone the conflict with Papadopoulos essentially made possible the overwhelming G/C No. Yet, three years later, when it did challenge Papadopoulos it managed to secure a clear victory, capitalising on its neutral and vague stance of 2004. However the rejectionist camp was not neutralised with its defeat in the presidential elections. It was rather coopted by Christofias in an uneasy coalition government. EVROKO and the Church remain staunch opponents of the reunification process and so do significant minorities in the centrist parties. Nevertherless AKEL and the pro – solution forces in DISI have the upper hand this time. It remains to be seen if in the much improved climate of 2008, AKEL will take the lead and proceed to a settlement living up to the promise Christofias made in 2004 that the ultimate aim is to solidify the Yes.


Primary sources:

Greek Cypriot newspapers: Phileleftheros, Politis, Simerini, Charavgi

Press and Information Office Publications (Republic of Cyprus)
1.The Cyprus Problem, 1999
2.Cyprus: no man is an island, 2003
3.President Papadopoulos' speech for the referendum, April 2003

1.Vasiliou George, Reply to the President (booklet used by the Yes campaign)
2.Voice of the People, Do you trust the Turks? (leaflet used in the No campaign)
3.Pancyprian Citizens Movement leaflet (the main NGO of the No campaign)
4.Ministry of Education and culture, Den ksehno ke ayonizome (I do not forget and I fight), 2000, (primary school textbook)

Eleven interviews conducted in the summer of 2004 after the referendum with politicians, civil society activists, civil servants and students.

Secondary sources:

Barthes Roland, Mythologies, London, 1973

Demetriou Olga, To cross or not to cross? Subjectivation and the absent state in Cyprus, Journal of Anthropological Institute 13, 2007, pp 987-1006

Demetriou Themos and Vlachos Soteris, Prodomeni ekseyersi, Lefkosia, 2007

Droushiotis Makarios, documentary To deleterio, 2007

Giddens Anthony, The constitution of society, Polity Press, 1984

Heraclides Alexis, The self determination of minorities in international politics, Frank Cass: London, 1991

Katttos Soteris, Politis 23rd September 2007

Kizilyurek Niyazi, Cyprus: the dead end of nationalisms (in greek) Athens, 1999

Lordos Alexandros, Can the Cyprus Problem be solved? Understanding the Greek Cypriot response to the UN Peace Plan for Cyprus: an evidence – based study conducted by Cymar Market Research Ltd 1-15 September 2004. Available at

Lordos Alexandros et al, Options for Peace: mapping the possibilities for a comprehensive settlement in Cyprus. A bi-communal survey of public opinion conducted by Cymar Market Research Ltd and Kadem Cyprus Social Research 15-30 May 2005. Available at

Lordos Alexandros et al, Building Trust: an inter-communal analysis of public opinion in Cyprus conducted by Cymar Market Research Ltd and Kadem Cyprus Social Research 10-25 April 2006. Available at

Lordos Alexandros, 8th July 2006: The unappreciated breakthrough, Cyprus Review Vol 18:2, Fall 2006

Mavratsas Ceasar, Faces of Greek nationalism in Cyprus: idelogical conflict and the social construction of Greek Cypriot identity 1974-1996, (in greek) Athens, 1998

Papadakis Yiannis, Enosis and Turkish expansionism: real myths or mythical realities? In Calotychos edition, Cyprus and its people, Westview Press, 1998

Papadakis Yiannis, unpublished doctoral dissertation, The historical dialectic of identity, 1993

Perikleous Chrysostomos, The referendum of 2004, (in greek), Papazisi: Athens, 2007

Platis Stelios et al, The property regime in a Cyprus settlement, PRIO Report, 2006

Potier Tim, Britain and Cyprus: From Referendum to reunification?, in Faustmann and Peristianis' edition, Britain in Cyprus 1878-2006, Peleus: Bibliopolis, 2006

Tocci Nathalie, Reflections on post-referendum Cyprus, European University Institute, 2004

Webster Craig and Christoforou Christoforos, Spring Survey 2004, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and the future: the day after the referendum, available through PIO

1. The Cyprus Problem, (Press Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, 1999) p.4
2. Cyprus: no man is an island, (Press Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, 2003) p.4
3. Papadopoulos' speech for the referendum, p.12
4. Papadopoulos ' speech, p.8
5. Spring Survey 2004: G/Cs, T/Cs and the future: the day after the referendum
6. Two G/Cs died while demonstrating on the green line, one beaten to death, and the other shot while trying to down the Turkish flag.
7. I do not forget and I fight, (Ministry of Education, 2000) p.10
8. Charavgi, 9th March, p.4 Turkish propaganda is not a guarantee for a viable solution
9. Drousiotis Makarios, documentary To deletirio, 2007
10. Drousiotis Makarios in his documentary “To deletirio” (2007) argues that deliberately the g/c refrained from presenting the positive issues of the Annan Plan and contributed to the building up of the image of the Turkish solution as called by the Turkish media and promoted by Ertogan's government.
11. Simerini 14th March, Settlers: a long term burden
12. Simerini 4th April, In the mercy of the settlers (front page)
13. The “danger” of settlers being present in the federal government was a central issue of the No campaign
14. Politis 10th April, Phenomena
15. Papadopoulos' speech p.5
16. Papadopoulos’ speech p.6
17. Perikleous Chrysostomos, To demopsifisma tou 2004, Papazisi, 2007
18. Papadopoulos' speech p.11
19. Political advertisement Pancyprian Citizens Movement
20. Charavgi, 14th April Proposal of Central Committee to Party Congress
21. To Vima, 25th April, From the Macedonian fiasco to the Cyprus deadlock
22. For an ın dept analysis of the formation and evolution of Greek and Turkish nationalisms see Ozkırımlı Umut and Sofos Spyros, Tormented by history: Nationalism in Greece and Turkey, Hurst, 2008
23. Political advertisement, Voice of the People
24. See Perikleous, 2007
25. Papadopoulos’ speech p.6
26. Vassiliou, Reply to the President, p.7
27. Simerini 21st March p.8, The Greeks serfs of the Turks
28. Simerini 10th April, Front page, Government: the future of civil servants is hanging in the air
29. Papadopoulos' speech, p.6
30. The classic phenomenon of the bubble with the consequence of a major redistribution from small investors to big players with inside information.
31. Spring Survey 2004, p.2
32. Papadopoulos' speech p. 12
33. Politis 13th June, General Secretary Report to the Security Council
34. For an analysis of the process leading to the No see Perikleous, 2007.
35. Phileleftheros, 27th March, Interview with Trade Minister
36. Papadopoulos' speech p.9
37. Papadopoulos' speech p.10
38. A product of the historical military alliance between the US and Turkey as well as the current wave of global anti-Bushism
39. Charavgi 12th March, editor’s column
40. Simerini, 6th April, Resistance
41. Phileleftheros 19th March, Incompatibility of Annan Plan and EU in Cyprus
42. All television channels were predisposed towards the No. Kofi Annan notes that none was interested to cooperate with a T/C channel in producing a program where citizens could address questions to a UN representative about the Plan. According to Television Authority statistics in Politis 23rd April, time allocated to No supporters was double to that of the Yes supporters.
43. Article 4, Pancyprian Citizens Movement
44. Article 4, Pancyprian Citizens Movement
45. Pancyprian Citizens Movement, leaflet
46. Phileleftheros 3rd April, Defending the bases of European civilization
47. Charavgi, 16th March, Annan Plan: the creation of a regime of ethnic discrimination
48. After nineteen years, the G/Cs in the T/C state could reach up to 33% of its population.
49. Phileleftheros 19th March, Incompatibility of Annan Plan and EU in Cyprus
50. Phileleftheros 19th March, Incompatibility of Annan Plan and EU in Cyprus
51. Kofi Annan’s report to the Security Council in Politis 13th June
52. See Lordos Alexandros surveys of 2004, 2005 and 2006
53. The celebration of Mayday (Bir Mayis) in North Nicosia is attended by an increasing number of Greek Cypriots every year since the opening of the checkpoints.
54. Kattos Soteris, Politis 23 Sepetember 2007
55. See Potier for the deterioration of relations between Papapdopoulos' regime and Britain
56. For an interpretation of the soft No and the politics inside AKEL see Trimikliniotis in
57. For an anthropological examination of the crossing process see Demetriou
58. Platis et al, 2006

Friday, June 13, 2008

Οι διανοούμενοι

Στην πραγματικότητα ο ρόλος των διανοουμένων -κι αυτό ισχύει εδώ και χιλιάδες χρόνια- συνίσταται στο να κάνουν ό,τι πρέπει ώστε οι άνθρωποι να παραμένουν παθητικοί, υπάκουοι, αστοιχείωτοι και προγραμματισμένοι...
Γνωρίζω ανθρώπους που δεν έχουν καμιά σχολική παιδεία αλλά είναι τουλάχιστον στα μάτια μου, αξιοθαύμαστοι διανοούμενοι. Και γνωρίζω σεβάσμιους πανεπιστημιακούς και συγγραφείς που απέχουν πολύ από το να ανταποκριθούν σε αυτό το ιδανικό. Οι "αναγνωρισμένοι διανοούμενοι" είναι ένα διαφορετικό ζήτημα. Με αυτόν τον όρο, εννοώ εκείνους που μέσα στο δικό τους σύστημα εξουσίας, έχουν τιμηθεί με τον τίτλο των "υπεύθυνων διανοουμένων" εξάλλου έτσι ακριβώς χαρακτηρίζουν τον εαυτό τους στην Δύση. Καμιά φορά τους αποκαλούν "τεχνοκράτες διανοούμενους" για να τους ξεχωρίσουν από τους "ανατρεπτικούς διανοούμενους" που σπείρουν την αναστάτωση και είναι "ανεύθυνοι"...

Νόαμ Τσόμσκυ, Δυο ώρες διαύγειας, 1999